Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 54

Issue 4

Article 4

1966

Regulation: A Defense to Anti-Merger Litigation?
G. E. Hale
Rosemary D. Hale

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Hale, G. E. and Hale, Rosemary D. (1966) "Regulation: A Defense to Anti-Merger Litigation?," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 54: Iss. 4, Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol54/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Regulation: A Defense
To Anti-Merger Litigation?
By G. E. HATE* - ROSEMARY D. HALE**
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Paul S. Gerding and Kelvyn
H. Lawrence, members of the nlinois bar. This article will form a chapter of a
book to be entitled The Anti-Merger Laws by the same authors.

Introduction

Mergers and acquisitions by business enterprises are severely
affected by the federal antitrust laws." Some observers have gone
so far as to indicate that there now is scarcely such a thing as a
2
legal "horizontal" merger (i.e., a joinder of competing firms).
Burdens on plaintiffs seem minimal: pleading and proof that the
acquisition will increase "concentration" by something more than
an insignificant percentage in a relevant product and geographic
market will just about suffice. 3
Nevertheless, a defendant is not wholly helpless. In varying
degrees, several affirmative defenses may be available to him. If the
acquired firm, for example, has been adjudicated a bankrupt, the
antitrust laws may not be applicable. 4 Several other defenses may
be tendered." Prominent among them is the plea that the de* A.B. Yale College 1935; LL.B. Harvard Law School 1938; S.J.D. University of Chicago 1940.
A.B. Mount Holyoke College 1940; M.A. American University 1946.
' E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. & Rome Cable Co., 377 U.S. 271
(1964).
2 E.g., Markham, The New Antitrust Policy, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 607,
616 (1965).
3E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,- 370 U.S.- 294-- (1962),
4 Hale & Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the Antitrust
Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964).
5Among the other affirmative defenses which may be tendered are the following, none of which is surely solid:

a. want of jurisdiction under the statutes relied upon

-

b. under § 7 of the Clayton Act, that the acquisition was made from a
natural person and not a corporation
C. under the same section: a purchase for investment
d. under the same section: the formation of a subsidiar" company
e. that the merger will enhance competition by creating larger firms to
combat the giants of the industry (countervailing power)
f. that entry into the industry is easy
g. that demand for the industry's products is elastic.
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fendant is a member of a regulated industry; that, in that industry, regulation has supplanted competition; that, accordingly,
there is no room left for application of the antitrust laws.
Nature of regulation.6 All business is subject in some degree
to governmental regulation. We are all familiar, of course, with
statutes prescribing standards of health and safety: an enterprise
utilizing a truck to make delivery of its products is subject to
motor traffic codes. Such controls, of course, do not give rise to
an exemption from the antitrust laws. If, however, the industry
is subject to "interventionist" regulation such an exemption may
be expressed or implied in the regulatory enactment. By "interventionist" is meant that type of control which affects the
fundamental decisions of the enterprise. Familiar are the controls
over prices and products applicable to public utilities. Whether
such interventionist measures should constitute an exemption
from the antitrust laws generally-and, of course, anti-merger
legislation in particular-has been the subject of careful scrutiny.
After a review of several loosely and tightly regulated industries
a test was proposed: if the industry is "pervasively" regulated then,
subject to some limitations, the operation of the antitrust laws
should be suspended.7 A merger in such an industry should not
be subject, for example, to the provisions of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
If, on the other hand, the regulation is less than "pervasive", antimerger legislation should enjoy full play.
Primary jurisdiction. Before examining the subject of exemption itself we should pause to consider the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. That is the rule under which courts decline to
entertain litigition on subjects which lie within the appointed
responsibility of administrative tribunals." Closely related thereto
is the rule of exclusive jurisdiction. It is, for example, elementary
6An earlier version of this chapter appeared in article form in 59 Nw.
U.L. 7Rev. 49 (1964). It has been greatly expanded and brought up to date.
Hale & Hale, Competition or Control I: The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 641 (1958); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585 (1959); Hale & Hale, Competition
or Control III: Motor Carriers, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 775 (1960); Hale & Hale,
Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1961); Hale &
Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated
Industries, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 46 (1962). As to the adoption of the proposed
test, consult Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 300 (1963).
Cf. California v. Federal Power Conmm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577, 579
8Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered,
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that the courts will not entertain suits with respect to the level of
railroad rates: the Interstate Commerce Comission enjoys exclusive
jurisdiction to determine their reasonableness.9
Origins of the doctrine lie in rate reparation cases which should
have been brought before the Interstate Commerce Commission
but the principle is now widely applied to proceedings which
could be instituted before many types of regulatory tribunals.' 0
It has been applied, for example, to a suit for damages for refusal
to serve by a common carrier gas pipeline: the court held that
primary jurisdiction lay in the Federal Power Commission., It is
true that the doctrine is often disregarded. Sometimes the courts
seem to be whimsical and retain suits which would ordinarily
appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals. 12 However that may be, the doctrine of primary jurisdic9 United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956). As to the
distinction between primary and exclusive jurisdiction, consult Mitchell, Primary
Jurisdiction, 13 A.B.L Rep. (Antitrust Sect.) 26, 29, 38 (1958). Among the
cases in which doctrines of primary or exclusive jurisdiction have been applied are
Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. Uted States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574, 576 (1952); Umted States Nay. Co.
v. Cunard Co., 284 U.S. 474, 481 (1932); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110
F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1952). In United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
358 U.S. 334, 348 (1959). the Court wrote:
That some resolution is necessary when the antitrust policy of free
competition is placed beside a regulatory scheme involving fxed rates
is obvious . . . . Accordingly, this Court consistently held that when
rates and practices relating thereto were challenged under the antitrust
laws, the agencies had primary jurisdiction to consider the reasonableness of such rates and practices in the light of the many relevant
factors including alleged antitrust violations, for otherwise sporadic action
by federal courts would disrupt an agency's delicate regulatory scheme,
and would throw existing rate structures out of balance.
10OAs to the origins of the doctrines, consult Jaffe, supra n. 8, at 577, 581,
593; Trienens, Types of Questions Subject to the Primary Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies, 13 A.B.A. Rep. (Antitrust Sect.) 42, 44 (1958). In some
cases exclusive jurisdiction lies in the Court. California v. Federal Power Comm n,
369 U.S. 482 (1962). Query: whether a commission would have jurisdiction if no
case were pending before the Court.
"2 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Co., 209 F.2d 380, 384
(9th Cir. 1953). Note also that in some instances courts may refer litigation to a
commission to determine whether the defendant's conduct has been immunized
from the antitrust laws. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Aircoach Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877 886 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). Consult generally, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.08 (1958).
12 Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956);
United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 882 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965); Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 170 F. Supp. 354, 365, 366
(D.D.C. 1959). In Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra, at 883, the court
wrote:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is flexible, and we should shape
it and, if necessary, strain it to fit the peculiar posture of this case in
order to reach a practical accommodation of court and agency. The
Board approved this merger long before the Philadelphia decision. It
(Continued on next page)
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tion is one which can scarcely be overlooked when a regulated industry is confronted with a complaint based upon the anti-merger
laws.
Supplementary antitrust sanctions.Application of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that a regulated
industry will not be subject to the substantive provisions of the
antitrust laws. It may well be the case that the administrative
tribunal has been directed to enforce antitrust sanctions. Section
11 of the Clayton Act indeed explicitly provides that § 7 of that
legislation, among others, shall be enforced by the several regulatory tribunals mentioned therein. 13 Thus the Federal Communcations Commission has been expressly designated as the appropriate tribunal for the enforcement of § 7 of the Clayton Act
with respect to common carriers of communications. The Civil
Aeronautics Board is similarly directed to apply the substance of
anti-merger legislation to air carriers. 14 It does not, however,
follow that the agency must apply antitrust principles in disregard of directives contained in its organic legislation. As we
shall see, the contrary may well be true. Take, for example, the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Pursuant to § 11 of the Clayton
Act it is directed to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act as to rail and
motor carriers. Under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act,
however, it must take into account many factors other than the
antitrust laws. Thus in considering the merger of motor carriers the Interstate Commerce Commission must consider much
more than the prohibitions of § 7. In the leading case on the
subject the United States Supreme Court wrote:
...the Commssion is not to measure proposals for all-rafl or
all-motor consolidations by the standards of the antitrust laws.
Congress authorized such consolidations because it recognized
that in some circumstances they were appropriate for effectua(Footnote continued from preceding page)

never invoked juridiction under Clayton § 11 for it was undoubtedly
laboring under the common mistake that Clayton § 7 did not apply to
bank mergers effected by an acquisition of assets. Consult Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 518 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Jaffe, supra n. 8.
13 Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1914).
14
Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1963).
Accord, Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 180 F.2d 28,
83 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605,
613-14 (D. Del. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 364 U.S. 280 (1960). Cf. Federal
Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 493 (1958).
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tion of the national transportation policy. It was informed that
this policy would be hurt by "encouraging the organization of
stronger units" in the motor carrier industry. And in authorizing those consolidations it did not import the general policies
of the antitrust laws as a measure of their permissibility.
...It

[Congress] in terms relieved participants in appropriate

mergers from the requirements of those [antitrust] laws.
...In

doing so, it presumably took into account the fact that

the business affected is subject to strict regulation and supervision, particularly with respect to rates charged the publican effective safeguard against the evils attending monopoly,
at which the Sherman Act is directed. Against the background, no other inference is possible but that, as a factor in
determining the propriety of motor-carrer consolidations the
preservation of competition among carriers, although still a
value, is significant chiefly as it aides in the attainment of the
objectives of the national transportation policy. 15 .
As subsequent sections reveal, the obligation of administrative
tribunals to apply anti-merger policy varies from industry to
industry. From a bewildering array of cases derivation of coherent
principles seems impossible.' 6 All we can conclude here is that
agencies as well as courts may be directed to apply antitrust
principles to regulated industries but that other, competing,
principles may prevent their being given full play. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is merely adjective in character; it selects
the forum but does not choose the law to be applied. Finally, and
even more confusingly, even if the administrative agency is charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws and gives consideration
thereto, its adjudication may prove no bar to anti-merger litigation
7
in the courts.'
Exemption, express or implied. We return to the substance of
the matter. The question is whether a regulated industry should
enjoy an exemption from the anti-merger legislation applicable to
the free sector of the economy. In many cases the question is easily
answered by reference to an express statutory exemption. Such a
provision is found, for example, in the Interstate Commerce
15 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 85-86 (1944). It is,
of course, true that most regulatory tribunals are not concerned'with the enforcement of the antitrust statutes at all. E.g., Illinois Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Peoples
App. 1934).
& Coal Co., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 403, 423 (M11.
Gas Light
10 Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 92 (1957).
17 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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Act.' 8 Difficulty arises when no such provision is found in express
form and the courts must determine whether it was the legislative
intent to place the industry beyond the scope of antitrust legislation. Here the touchstone is the word "pervasive". As indicated
above,' 9 if the interventionist regulation is "pervasive" in character, the courts are apt to find that the antitrust laws have been
supplanted. 20 It follows that mergers may be consummated without reference to § 7 of the Clayton Act and other legislation
considered in this book.21 Such a result is logical because the
existence of pervasive regulation is thought to protect the public
from whatever ill consequences might attend the consummation
of mergers. Furthermore, it is well established that it is easier to
regulate fewer firms.22 If, therefore, regulation is relied upon to
produce the results which competition is thought to produce in
the free sector of the economy, there is no reason to disapprove
a merger2m If, on the other hand, the regulation is non-pervasive
in character, then mergers continue to be subject to § 7 of the
Clayton Act and related statutes. Here the courts have surprised
the bar by declaring that much regulation is non-pervasive in
character. 24. Two leading examples include the Federal Power
Commission's authority over pipelines2 5 and the Federal Communication's Commission control of broadcasting. In the latter
case the court declared the Communications Commission was
under a duty to consider the antitrust laws in approving the
18 Interstate Commerce Act § 5, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1887); Pan Am. Airways, Inc.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
19 Consult Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust
Laws to Regulated Industries, supra n. 7.
2o
Id. at 57-58.
21
Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305, 309-310
(1963) (semble); but of. Trans-World Airlines v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 610
(2d 22
Cir. 1964).
Backman, Government Price Fixing 69 (1938); Murphy, Wartime Concentration of British Industry, 57 Q. J. Econ. 139 (1942); Stocking and Watkins,
Monopoly and Free Enterprise 504 (1951).
23 Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959), affirming
165 F.
24 Supp. 893 (D. Minn. 1958) (express exemption in statute).
Hale & Hale, Mergers in Regulated Industries, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 49. 55

(1964). On March 6, 1963, an inter-agency committee of the federal government
published a report generally favorable to the application of antitrust standards
to mergers in regulated industries. Fula, Antitrust Aspects of Recent Transportation Mergers, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 723, 727 (1964). Whatever the outcome in the
federal courts, it is believed that the state courts are less likely to apply antitrust
standards to such mergers. E.g., State Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Romberg, 275 111.
App. 432, 114 N.E. 191 (1916).
-5 California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).

1966]

A

DEFENSE

To

ANT-MEtGER

acquisition of a broadcasting station but that its determination
was a nullity in subsequent litigation before the courts. 28 Thus
even though regulation appears to be extensive it does not necessarily follow that anti-merger legislation cannot be applied to the
industry despite the anamolous results which may be derived
27
therefrom.
Rail carriers. In approaching the topic of railroad mergers
we should first note that rail carriers are not wholly exempt from
the antitrust laws. Despite the fact that they appear to be pervasively regulated the courts have repeatedly held that antitrust
legislation generally is applicable to them. In the famous case
of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad, for example, the United
States Supreme Court wrote:
These carriers are subject to the anti-trust laws .... Conspiracies among carriers to fix rates were included in the
broad sweep of the Sherman Act .... Congress has not given
the Commission ...

authority to remove rate-fixing combina-

tions from the prohibitions contained in the antitrust laws.
It has not placed those combinations under the control and
supervision of the Commission nor has it empowered the
Commission to proceed against such combinations and
through cease and desist orders or otherwise to put an end
to their activities. Regulated industries are not per se exempt
from the Sherman Act.... 2 8
In spite of such bold language the courts have long found that
there were a number of implied limitations upon the application
of antitrust to railroads. Thus it was early held that a private party
may not bring a bill under § 16 of the Clayton Act to enjoin mis2

United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959).
Consult generally, Hyeman, Public Encouragement of Monopoly in the
Utility Industries, 147 Annals 160, 165-66 (1930); Note, Judicial Application of
Antitrust
Law to Regulated Industries, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1160-61 (1951).
28
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U. S. 439, 456 (1945). Accord, Chicago
& Northwestern Ry. v. Peoira & P. Union Ry., 319 F.2d 117, 122 (7th Cir. 1963).
The reasoning behind such decisions is presumably that stated in United States
v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214, 231 (1922), on remand, 290 Fed. 443 (D.
Utah, 1923), wherein it was said:
'While many practices, formerly in vogue, are eliminated by the
legislation of Congress regulating interstate commerce, and throtgh rates
and transportation may be had under public supervision, there are
elements of competition in the granting of special facilities, the prompt
carrying and delivery of freight ,the ready and agreeable adjustment and
settlement of claims, and other elements which that legislation does not
control.
0
27
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conduct of railroads.29 Similarly, a treble damage suit may not
be instituted under the provisions of the antitrust laws to recover
profits lost through imposition of allegedly unreasonably high
rates.30 In both instances the courts quickly perceived that litigation could easily disrupt the regulatory pattern prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Act. If a private litigant could establish that
rates were unreasonably high and recover treble damages, he
would occupy a favored position and other shippers would be discriminated against by the judgment in his favor.31 Finally, the
Reed-Bulwinkle Act32 expressly permits a certain amount of
collaboration among railroads with .respect to the fixing of rates.
Hence it is not surprising that both the statutory and implied
limitations upon the application of the antitrust laws to railroads
have given rise to considerable question as to whether an absolute
exemption should not be found. In several instances application
of antitrust principles to railroads has been followed by proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission which in
effect negated the judgment of the court.33 In another instance
dissolution of common control over the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific pursuant to an antitrust decree prevented the construction of a line of railroad across the state of Oregon. Some
twenty years later the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered
that construction to proceed. 34
However that may be, it is plain that absent approval by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, railroad mergers may be and
have been attacked under the antitrust laws. Under both federal 35
29
Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal By. Ass'n, 288 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1933);
Wheeling & L. E. Ry. v. Pittsburgh By., 33 F.2d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 1929).
Cf. Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1934),
cert. 3denied, 293 U. S. 626 (1935).
OKeogh v. Chicago & Northwestern By., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922). See
Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R. 324 U.S. 439, 453 (1945) (dictum).
31
Texas & Pac. By. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 (1907).
32 Interstate Commerce Act § 5 (a) (6), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1887).
33
United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn of St. L., 224 U.S. 383 (1912), 266
U.S. 17 (1924); United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 290 Fed. 443, 450 (D.
Utah341923); Jansen, Railroad Mergers, Barron's, Dec. 17, 1956, pp. 11, 13-14.
1nterstate Commerce Comm'n v. Oregon-Washington R.R., 288 U.S. 14,
28-29 (1933). Consult Alderman, How Shall the Railroad Rate Structure be
Regulated
in the Public Interest?, 12 Law & Contemp. Prob. 579, 594 (1947).
35
United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922), on remand. 290
Fed. 443 (D. Utah 1923); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Phillips. Railroa
Mergers. 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 1. 3-7 (1962). Cf. Chicago & Northwestern
By. v. Peoria & P. Union Ry., 319 F.2d 117, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1963).
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and state statutes ° decrees have been entered preventing the
acquisition of one railroad by another. In some of the older state
cases that result is attributable to specific legislative or constitutional provisions 37 and it should also be noted that in other state
court decisions mergers of railroads have been found not opposed
to the public interest.38 It is further clear that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable; no court today should entertain
litigation to block a railroad merger because the matter falls within the cognizance of the Interstate Commerce Commission.39 Accordingly, we proceed to an examination of the powers and duties
of that tribunal.
Interstate Commerce Commission; its powers and standards.
In considering the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in passing upon railroad mergers we should first note that no such
acquisition may be carried out without submission of 'the matter
to the Commission for its approval. Section 5 of the Interstate
Commerce Act so provides and then sets forth the standards which
the Commission is to apply in determining whether the merger
should be approved. 40 Interestingly enough, nothing in the statute
refers to the maintenance of competition.41 It is, however, abundantly plain from the express language in the same section that

30 Pearsall v. Great No. By., 161 U.S. 646 (1896); Evansville Ry. v.
Evansville Elec. Ry., 50 Ind. App. 502, 98 N.E. 649 (1912); Eel River R. v
State,3 7155 Ind. App. 433, 57 N.E. 388, 396 (1900).
Hamilton v. Savannah, Fla. & W. By., 49 Fed. 412, 422-23 (C.C.S.D. Ga.
1892; Langdon v. Branch, 37 Fed. 449, 462-63 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1888); Central
R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 640 (1869); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Commonwealth,
97 Ky. 675, 31 S.W. 476 (1895), af'd, 161 U.S. 677, 698 (1896); Pennsylvania
Ry. v. Commonwealth, 3 Sad. 83. 7 Atl. 368 (Pa. 1886). See American Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota R.R., 157 IMI.App. 641, 650-51, 42 N.E. 153 (1895)
(dictum);
Il Const. art. 11, § 11; Martin, State Antitrust Laws LH (1940).
3
8Lisman v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 21 Fed. 413, 421 (4th Cir. 1914);
Venner v. New York Cent. RB.., 177 N.Y. Dep't . 296, 164 N.Y. Supp. 626, 63233 (1917), affd per curiam, 226 App. Div. 583, 123 N.E. 893 (1919), cert.
denied, 249 U.S. 617 (1919). See Chicago, M. & St. P. By. v. Franzen, 287 MI1.
Aup. 346, 352, 122 N.E. 492 (1919) (dictum); State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville By. & Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925) (dictum). Cf.
Bartonville Bus Line v. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 326 Ill. App. 200, 157 N.E.
175, 39176 (1927).
Chicago So. Shore By. v. Monon By., 235 F. Supp. 984, 986 (N.D. Ill.
1964). Cf. United States v. Railway Express Agency, 89 F. Supp: 981, 101 F.
Supp. 1008, 1012 (D. Del. 1951). Even after entry of an antitrust decree it may
be necessary to proceed before the ICC. United States v. Terminal R.R. 'Ass'n of
St. L..
40 224 U.S. 383 (1912), 266 U.S. 17 (1924).
lnterstate Commerce Act § 5(4), 49 U.S.C. § (5)(4). It should be
observed, however, that the ICC does not have unlimited powers over railroads.
United States v. Pennsylvania UB.R. 242 U.S. 208, 231 (1916).
41 Interstate Commerce Act § 5(c), 49 U.S.C. § 5(c).
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approval of such a transaction by the Commission relieves the
parties from the operation of the antitrust laws. 42 Accordingly, the
courts will dismiss complaints founded upon alleged violations
of the antitrust laws when such matters have received the approval
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 43 Further, the United
States Supreme Court has made it plain that the Commission is not
to measure merger proposals by antitrust standards. In considering
acquisitions it must accomodate the policies of the antitrust laws
into the larger considerations of national transportation policy
expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act. The public interest is
measured by the latter enactment and the antitrust laws do not
44
constitute measures of permissibility in such cases.

More recently, in approving another ICC order allowing a
merger, a district court spoke of a merger trend in the transportation industry as a necessity in order to secure adequate
transportation service. 45 It reviewed the 1920 legislation which
directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to prepare a plan
of consolidation and the 1940 Act which relieved the Commission
of that responsibility and left the matter to the initiative of the
carriers. 46 While an amazing recent decision of another district
court appears to take a wholly different view of the Commission's
responsibility,47 it is not believed that the prohibitions of § 7 of
the Clayton Act are to be literally applied to railroad mergers.
As a matter of fact, mergers and consolidations have long been
routine in that industry. The Pennsylvania Railroad alone is
composed of what were once 600 separate carriers. 48 After the
421d. § 5(11), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (11).
43
United States v. Railway Express Agency, 89 F. Supp. 981, 101 F. Supp.

1008, 1013-14 (D. Del. 1951). Contra, Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Peoria

& P. Union Ry., 319 F.2d 117, 122 (7th Cir. 1963).
44 Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1959),
affirming 165 F. Supp. 893 (D. Minn. 1958); McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States,
4 5 321 U.S. 67, 83 (1944).
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 221 F.
Supp. 19, 22 (E.D. Mich. 1963), affirming 317 I.C.C. 261 (1962).
40 Id. at 23, 30.
47
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 14, 18, 20 (M.D. Fla.
19r5). reversed sub. nom., Seaboard Airline Ry. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154
(1965).
which give immunity from the antitrust laws by reason of § 414, the
whole criminal law enforcement problem remains unaffected by the
Act ....
Moreover, on the civil side violations of antitrust laws other
than those enumerated in the Act might be imagined. We, therefore,

refuse to hold that there are no antitrust violations left to the Depart(Continued on next page)
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1920 legislation, as indicated above, the Interstate Commerce
Commission attempted to draft plans of consolidation. Upon
failure of the Commission to draft an acceptable plan the
Transportation Act of 1940 made it plain that initiative was to
revert to the carriers and the Commission was to view mergers on
grounds other than those embodied in the antitrust laws. 49 It has
done so5° and while it occasionally takes cognizance of facts
protectionist manner. In other words, the Commission is fearful
that traffic may be "diverted" from a carrier not party to the
merger rather than that competition will be reduced. 2 It therefore appears likely that the Commission will approve railroad
mergers if the parties can show a prospect of improved service to
53
shippers and reduced costs through consolidation of facilities.
Motor carriers. There is little difference between the rules
applicable to railroads and those affecting motor carriers. 54 One
difference lies in the exemption in favor of motor carriers of
minimal size. Such small operators need not submit merger applications for the Interstate Commerce Commission's approval. 5
Otherwise the standards applicable are substantially identical to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

nent of justice to enforce.
Liipfert, Consolidation and Competition in Transportation,31 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 106, 110 (1962).
49 Id. at 113; Dearing & Owen, National Transportation Policy ch. 15 (1949);
Phillips,
Railroad Mergers, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1962).
5
oPere Marquette Ry. Merger, 267 I.C.C. 207, 246-47 (1947); Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 474 (1956); Phillips, supra n. 49, at 10, 13. For a description
of pending railway merger, including the giant Pennsylvania-New York Central
proposal, consult Fulda, supra n. 24, at 729-42.
51 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Purchase, 271 I.C.C. 5, 17, 22, 38 (1948); Pere
Marquette Ry. Merger, 267 I.C.C. 207, 233 (1947); Ill-A Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 458, 474, 500 (1931).
52Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 185 (1958),
affirming 165 F. Supp. 893 (D. Minn. 1958); Chesapeake & 0. Ry Purchase,
271 I.C.C. 5, 28, 39 (1948). Attention is invited to the famous decision in Lake
Line Applications under Panama Canal Act, 33 I.C.C. 700 (1915). In that
decision the commission forbade the eastern trunk railways to own and operate
lake steamers on the grounds that they would set water rates at levels so high as
to divert
tonnage to the all-rail routes of the parallel carriers.
5
3 Conant, Railroad Consolidations and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Stan. L. Rev.
489, 510 (1962); Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries § 4.10, 4.11,
4.12 (1961).
54Interstate Commerce Act I 5(2)(a); 49 U.S.C. § 5(5)(2)(a); Meck
& Bogue. Federal Regulation of Motor Carrier Unification, 50 Yule L.J. 1376,
1381 (1941): Hale & Hale, Competition or Control III: Motor Carriers, 108 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1960).
55 Interstate Commerce Act § 5(10), 49 U.S.C. § 5(10); Ship-by-Truck Co.
v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 847 (D. Kan. 1962).
48

KENTUcKY LAW JOUmNAL

[Vol. 54,

those affecting railroads.5 6 The antitrust laws, while to be taken
into consideration, are not deemed controlling. Thus in the
leading case of the McLean Trucking Company v. United States
the United States Supreme Court said:
[TIhere can be little doubt that the Commission is not to
measure proposals for .... consolidation by the standards of
the antitrust laws. Congress authorized such consolidations
because it recognized that in some circumstances they were
appropriate for effectuation of the national transportation
policy. It was informed that this policy would be furthered by
"encouraging the organization of stronger units".... [Iln determining the propriety of motor-carrier consolidations the
preservation of competition among carriers, although still a
value, is significant chiefly as it aids in the attainment
of the
57
objectives of the national transportation policy.
In conformance with those instructions the Interstate Commerce
Commission has approved numerous mergers of motor carriers.5 8
In one instance such a merger was approved despite the fact that
the consolidated operation of the several separate carriers by contract means had previously been enjoined under the antitrust
laws. In that case the Interstate Commerce Commission wrote:
While it is undoubtedly true that consummation of the
instant transaction will result in the elimination of some
competition among the transferor-applicants, that alone is not
the controlling consideration. Nearly every unification approved by us serves to reduce competition by eliminating it between, or among, the carriers involved .... Under section 5
(2) (c) .... we are required to give weight, among other
things, to the effect such transaction would have upon adequate transportation Allied would render .... to the public.
The transaction, therefore, must be viewed in the light of
whether, if consummated adequate service to the public, and,
more important, whether it would injuriously affect the
service of remaining carriers of household goods by reason
-of the detrimental effects on them through competition,
monopolistic or discriminatory practices or otherwise. 9
56

Mergers of intrastate carriers are similarly controlled by state commissions.
E.g., Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Act § 13, Il. Rev. Stat. c. 95 /2 §§ 282.1
if; Harper, Economic Regulation of the Motor Trucking Industries by the States
178 (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences Vol. 43, 1959).
57
5 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1944).
8 Fulda, op. cit. supra n. 53, at § 5.26.
59
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The Commission therefore is likely to approve mergers of motor
carriers where they promise to effect reductions in costs. 60 On the
other hand, it may disapprove mergers for protectionist reasons.
Thus if the proposed merger promises to increase competition to
the point where other carriers might be forced out of business,
the Commission may well disapprove the acquisition so as to
61
shelter such third parties.
Critique of carriermergers. Many observers have found that
mergers among railroad carriers would produce substantial
economies. It has been suggested that new services, such as "piggyback", would grow more rapidly if consolidation of the railroad
system were effected. Duplication of facilities among the existing
carriers is thought to be wasteful.6 2 Not all observers, however,
agree that the economies to be effected would be significant and
some find diseconomies in the creation of systems too large for
efficient management. 63 Those who believe that regulation of carriers is no longer necessary or desirable of course, might well also
take a dim view of railroad mergers. Whether the numerous
mergers now proposed are eventually approved by the Commission
and the reviewing courts may therefore depend upon the progress of the movement toward de-regulation of the transportation industry.
Air carriers.As in the case of ground transport, no merger of
airlines may be consummated without submission thereof to and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

M.C.C. 557, 592 (ICC 1946).
6OGlendenning Motorways, Inc., 75 M.C.C. 191, 201 (1958); Best Motor
Lines-Purchase-Highway Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 38 M.C.C. 199, 205 (1942);
Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation-Purchase-Charles 0. Lovette, 37 M.C.C.
791, 794 (1941); Re: Short Line of Massachusetts, 1 P.U.R.3d 120-22 (Mass.
1953); Hale & Hale, supra n. 54, at 775, 799, 803.
61E.WA. Peake, 59 M.C.C. 165, 184 (1953); Schein's Express-Purchase
(Portion)-Central Jersey Motor Lines, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 534, 548 (1953); Hale
& Hale,
6 2 supra n. 54, at 775, 802.
Conant, supra n. 53, at 495; Liipfert supra n. 48, at 106, 120, 126-28;

Phillips, supra n. 49, at 21; Troxil, Economics of Public Utilities 46 (1947);
Fulda,
6 op. cit. supra n. 53, at HI 4.5, 4.13.

3 Healy, The Merger Movement in Transportation, 52 Pro6. Am. Econ.
Ass'n 436, 439, 441 (1962). The author further claimed (at 444) that mergers
might impair technical innovation in railroading. Cf. Roberts, Dircusiion (of
Healy's preceding paper), 52 Proc. Am. Econ. Ass'n 445 (1962).U Mitchell, Let's Bring Regulation to Date, 22 ICC Prac. J. 187-93 (1954).
We cannot here embark on the long history of attempted railroad diversification
into motor carrier operations. Consult Cramton, Diversification of Ownership in

the Regulated Industries, 19 A.B.A. Rep. (Antitrust Sect.) 862, 364-65 (1961).
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approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 5 (It is interesting to note
that the Board controls acquisition of physical property, such as
aircraft, in addition to acquisitions of other airlines.) 66 Exclusive
jurisdiction over such matters is vested in the Board, which means,
of course, that the courts must dismiss a complaint seeking to
attack an airline merger. The United States Supreme Court has
expressly held that all relief against division of territories, allocation of routes or combinations between common carriers, air carriers and their affiliations must be sought from the Board.6 7 Some
old authorities to the contrary should no longer be regarded as
controlling.68 A merger approved by the Board enjoys express
exemption from the operation of the antitrust laws. 69 Here again
one may disregard older decisions. 70
Like the Interstate Commerce Commission again, the Board
is vested with authority to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act.71
Furthermore, its organic statute provides:
[T]he Board shall not approve any consolidation, merger
... which would result in creating a monopoly.., and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not
a party to the consolidation, merger .... 72
In practice the Board has tended to approve many mergers. It
65
Federal Aviation Act § 408(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a); Pan Am. Airways,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 301 (1963).
66 Allen, Section 408 of the FederalAviation Act, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1073, 1085
(1959).
67
Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 302-03, 306-07, 310
(1963). Note, however, the fantastic exception suggested in the foregoing opinion
(at 305):
While the Board is empowered to deal with numerous aspects of what
are normally thought of as antitrust problems, those expressly entrusted
to it encompass only a fraction of the total. Apart from orders which
give immunity from the antitrust laws by reason of § 414, the whole
criminal law enforcement problem remains unaffected by the Act....
Moreover, on the civil side violations of antitrust laws other than those
enumerated in the Act might be imagined. We, therefore, refuse to
hold that there are no antitrust violations left to the Department of
Justice to enforce.
68
American Airlines v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953); S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 91 F. Supp. 269
(D.D.C. 1950), rev'4, 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Slick Airways v.
American Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 199, 209 (D. N.J. 1952); Hawaiian Airlines,
Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D. Hawaii 1948).
69 Federal Aviation Act, § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384; Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
70S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 91 F. Supp. 269 (D. D.C. 1950),
rev'd. 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
71Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
72 Federal Aviation Act, § 408(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b).
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has been impressed with the economies to be achieved through
combinations and accordingly permitted airlines to join forces.73
Indeed, on occasion it has almost forced carriers into combinations.7 4 Occasionally it has disapproved a merger on the grounds
that it might reduce competition." More frequently it has disapproved a merger because the strength of the resulting carrier might
proved a merger because the strength of the resulting carrier
might be such as to take traffic away from another certificated air
carrier.70 In other words, the Civil Aeronautics Board, like the
Interstate Commerce Commission, may take a protectionist point
of view in passing upon a merger application. It is likely, however,
to approve mergers unless the airlines involved are already
inordinately large or the result of the merger will be to divert
traffic from another existing airline.
Critique of CAB merger policy. Several observers have found
fault with the Civil Aeronautics Board for approving mergers too
readily. In their view the Board has not paid sufficient attention
to the preservation of competition. 77 In addition, some observers
believe that undue emphasis has been placed upon economies of
scale in airline merger proceedings. It is said, for example, that
medium size companies can achieve costs as low as the larger.78
73

Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955); Flying TigerSlick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326, 343 (1954); Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger
Case, 15 C.A.B.

708

(1952) ;Delta-Cicago

and Southern Merger

Case,

16

C.A.B.
647 (1952); Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246 (1950).
74
West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 972-73 (1952); EasternColonial, Acquisition of Assets, National-Colonial Integration Investigation, 18
C.ALB. 781 (1954), cc. 18 C.ALB. 453 (1954).
75 Staff of Antitrust Subcomm., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., Report on Airlines 254-56 (April 5, 1957); Fulda, Antitrust Aspects of
Recent TransportationMergers, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 742-43 (1964) (description of
disapproval of American-Eastern merger); Cellman, The Regulation of Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation, 24 J. Air L. & Com. 410, 25
id. 148, 168 (1958).
76 North Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 265 F.2d 581, 583
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959); American Airlines, Inc.,
Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 365 (1946);
Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246, 247-48 (1950); South-West-West
Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356 (1951). For mergers involving other modes of
transportation consult Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers,109
U. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 336-39 (1961).
77 Keyes, Federal Control of Entry into Air Transportation 80 (1951); Healy,
Workable Competition in Air Transportation, 35 Am. Econ. Rev., Supplement
1945,7 8p. 237.
Richmond. Regulation and Competition in Air Transportation 75 (1961);
Koontz, Economic and Managerial Factors Underlying Subsidy Needs of Domestic Trunk Line Air Carriers,18 J. Air L. & Com. 127, 133-34 (1951); Bingham
& Roberts, Transportation: Principles and Problems 184 (1952).
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Furthermore, the protectionist attitude of the Board in sheltering
one airline from the competition of another has invited adverse
criticism.7 9 It should nevertheless be noted that one cannot reckon
competition in the airline industry by merely comparing the overall size of the airlines. So far as competition is concerned the
relevant market lies in specific routes.8 0 If American Airlines, for
example, had a tremendous proportion of the New York-Chicago
traffic and Eastern Airlines none of that traffic but merely a large
proportion of the New York-Miami traffic, merger of the two
lines would not tend to reduce competition on the New YorkChicago run. Furthermore, there is respectable authority for the
proposition that there are true economies 'of scale in the operation
of fleets of airplanes and no one has established exactly where the
lowest cost may be achieved."' Finally, the Board was long concerned with the subsidy problem and hoped to secure its elimination. Its general objective has been to reduce subsidies and to
balance existing airlines, strengthening the weak ones by giving
them routes already served by the larger and more successful
2
enterprises.
Broadcasting.No license issued for radio or television broadcasting may be transferred without approval of the Federal Communications Commission.8 3 That tribunal, however, does not enjoy primary jurisdiction over merger" or- other cases85 wherein
antitrust questions may be raised. Similarly, broadcasters are
fully subject to the prohibitions of the antitrust laws 8 and are not
7
9Levi, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Regulated Industries, NYSBA
Symposium 136, 144-45(CCH 1959); Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in
United States Domestic Air Transportation,supra n. 75, at 180; Hale & Hale,
supra80n. 76, at 311, 321.
West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 992 (1952); Richmond,
op. cit. supra n. 78.
81 Gill & Bates, Airline Competition: A Study of the Effects of Competition
on the Quality and Price of Airline Service and the Self-sufficiency of the United
States82 Domestic Airlines 179, 182 (1949).
Richmond, op. cit. supra n. 78.
83
Communications Act of 1934 § 3.10(b), 47 U.S.C. § 3.10(b).
84
United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), reversing
158 F. Supp. 333, 348-49 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
85Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d
708. 709-10 (3d Cir. 1958). Cf. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260
U.S. 156, 162(1922).
86 The leading case is F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940). In that case the Court wrote (at 474):
In contradistinction to communication by telephone and telegraph,

(Continued on next page)
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even protected by explicit Commission approval of a merger
or acquisition. 7 The Commission has nevertheless been instructed
that it is to take account of antitrust policy in determining whether
to approve an acquisition." Apart from that, the courts have
given it little instruction with respect to the exercise of its powers
except that they are reluctant to see a license forfeited. 9 The Commission, in the apparent belief that it was implementing the antitrust laws has severely limited the issuance of licenses to one per
person per area for each type of broadcast service. In other words,
only a single AM broadcasting station may be owned by any one
person in a broadcast area.9 0 Since the Commission applies the
same rules with respect to transfers as it does to the issuance of
licenses 9' that limitation is important. It has also established by
rule limitations upon the total number of licenses which a person
may hold regardless of geographic location. Thus no one person
may hold more than seven television licenses. 92 It has attempted
(Footnote continued from precedIng page)

which the Communications Act recognizes as a common carrier activity
and regulates accordingly in analogy to the regulation of rail and other
carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Act recognizes
that broadcasters are not common carriers and are not to be dealt with
as such. Thus the Act recognizes the field of broadcasting is one of
free competition.
Accord, Television Transmission, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Cal. App. 2d 82,
301 P.2d 862, 865 (1956).
87 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959). Similar
views are expressed in Staff of Subcomm. on Antitrust, House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Television Broadcasting Industry 95
(March 13, 1957). In some earlier cases the courts suggested that an exemption
might exist. Yankee Network, Inc. v. F.C.C., 107 F.2d 212, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
Cf. Federal Broadcasting Sys. v. American Broadcasting Co., 167 F.2d 349, 352
(2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821 (1948). Some doubts of the same
nature were expressed in F.C.C. Network Study Staff (Barrow, director), Network Broadcasting, H.R. Doc. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 624 (1958);
Hansen, Broadcasting and the Antitrust Laws, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 572,
575 (1957).
88
United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959).
9
BChurchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1947). In
testifying before a congressional committee, an attorney who later became head
of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice commented that the Attome, General and the Federal Communications Commission were unsure of
their respective roles in the enforcement of the antitrust laws against broadcasters.
Hearinas on Television Network Practices Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
9047 C.F.R. § 3.35, 3.636. Cf. Jefferson" Standard Broadcating Co., 11
Radio Reg. 1059. 1060 (1955).
91 Hale & Hale, Competition or Control 11: Broadcasting, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev.
585, 615 (1959). Note also that licenses are renewed every thre& years, giving
the Commission some nower to take advantage of hindsight. Id. at 591.
9247 C.F.R. § 3.636 (a) (2). The regulations in question were approved in
question were approved in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192. 203-04 (1956).
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to curb the broadcasting networks9 3 and has from time to time attempted to prevent diversification of newspaper publishers into
the broadcasting business. 94 On the other hand, it recognized the
doctrine of countervailing power in one of the most important
merger cases brought to its attention. Here its efforts appeared to
be directed toward enhancing the power of the smaller of the
three national networks so as to achieve a better balance among
broadcasters.9 5 Note also that the Commission has a stringent
rule against delegation of authority under broadcasting licenses:
the licensee himself must determine the content of programs. 96
However well-intentioned some of the Commission's regulations do not appear to meet antitrust standards. The multiple
ownership rules, for example, take no account of geographic dispersion. Again, it is apparent that the Commission's reluctance
to permit newspaper publishers to diversify into broadcasting is
largely based on a protectionist desire to shelter existing broad97
casters from more vigorous competition.
Banking. A mystery surrounds the application of the antitrust
laws to banks. In the first place, §11 of the Clayton Act expressly
empowered the Federal Reserve Board to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act against banks. 98 Then in 1960 Congress enacted the Bank
93
E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 3.136; FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting 46-47, Commission
94 Order No. 37, Doc. No. 5060 (May, 1941).
McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d
511, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d
677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1951). cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951); Plains Radio
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949). A film producer, however, was not considered an improper transferee of a broadcasting license. 15
Radio95 Reg. 177, 183 (1957).
Paramount Television Prods., 8 P & F Radio Reg. 541, 624-25 (1953);
FCC, Network Study Staff (Barrow, director), Network Broadcasting, H. R. Rep.
No. 1297,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-81 (1958); Fortune, April, 1957, pp. 132-33.
.d 96 Massachusetts Universality Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183
F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1950); Regents of New Mexico College v. Albuquerque
Broadcasting Co., 158 F.2d 900, 906 (10th Cir. 1947); Albuquerque Broadcasting
Co. v. Regents of New Mexico College, 70 F. Supp. 198, 202 (N.D. Mex. 1945);
Voliva v. WCBD, Inc., 313 IM. App. 177, 183, 39 N.E.2d 685 (1942). Cf. Bay
Radir97 Inc., 15 Radio Reg. 211, 226 (1957).
Note, Diversificationand the Public Interest: Administrative Responsibility
of the FCC, 66 Yale L.J. 365, 367 (1957); FCC, Network Study Staff (Barrow,
director), Network Broadcasting, H.R. Rep. No. 1297, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 564
(1958), the Commissions hostility to networks reflects a strong antagonism toward9 8vertical integration in broadcasting. See note 11, supra.
Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1914); Transamerica Corp. v. Bd.
Govs. Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S
301 (1953). See United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348
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Merger Act which directed the Board and the other two federal
agencies controlling banks to consider antitrust questions in
exercising their statutory power to approve bank mergers. 99
Despite that legislation it appears that the banking agencies enjoy
neither primary nor exclusive jurisdiction to enforce antitrust
policy, the courts having at least concurrent jurisdiction. 00 Furthermore, as in the case of broadcasting and pipelines, the fact
that the administrative agencies have passed upon a merger and
approved it confers no immunity whatsoever in litigation. 101 This
result is particularly surprising since for many years it was not
considered that bank mergers fell within the scope of §7 of the
02
Clayton Act by reason of its exact language.
The authorities indicate that the rules applicable in the free
sector of the economy apply directly to mergers of banks; indeed,
it is possible that the courts may apply the statutes more rigorously
because the banks are so heavily regulated. 1 3 While the views of
the administrative agencies will be received by the courts, they are
not controlling. 10 4 The agencies themselves may, of course, deny
merger applications on other grounds such as that the acquisition
would tend to create conditions which would be unsafe for
depositors. As a district court recently put it:
[T]he sole standard for determining the validity of a merger
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts is the actual or potential
anti-competitive effect, while under the Bank Merger Act, the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

(E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321, 345 (1963). Cf. United States v.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 879 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
99
Fed. Deposit Ins. Act (Bank Merger Act), 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.
§1828(c) (1950); Note, Federal Regulation of Bank Mfergers, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
756, 757 (1962). Cf. Bank Holding Company Act § 3, 12 U.S.C. H§ 1841-48
(1956).
100 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867,
880 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 36 F.R.D. 7 (M.D.
Tenn. 1964).
102 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867,
878 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); United States v. Philadlephia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp
348, 350-51 (E.D. Pa. 1962), reo'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
1o2 Note, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 756, 759
(1962).
lo3United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 368-69
(E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321, 355-56 (1963). In that case it was said
that concentration in banking will particularly curb the alternatives of small
businessmen and hence would tend to create concentration in business generally.
1U4 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867,
878, 886 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 36 F.R.D. 7, 9
(M.D. Tenn. 1964).
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overall public interest, and not the anti-competitive effect, is
the governing criterion. Thus, the Bank Merger Act would appear to sanction agency approval of the merger, even though
it violated the antitrust laws, if, on a balance of all the designated factors, the agency decided that, nevertheless, it was in
the overall public interest. A court, however, would be obliged
to invalidate a merger found to violate the antitrust laws
even though it served the public interest.' 5
In view of the sweeping powers over banks enjoyed by both
federal' 0 6 and state agencies107 it is surprising that the courts have
seen fit to subject banking to the full impact of the anti-merger
laws. 10 8 The interpretive gymnastics employed by the United States
Supreme Court to apply §7 of the Clayton Act to banks and to
disregard the administrative procedure set forth in the Bank
Merger Act are even more perplexing.
Insurance. It is difficult to outline the relationship between
the insurance industry and the anti-merger laws in other than
chronological form. Prior to 1944 the federal courts held that
insurance was not "commerce" and hence that federal antitrust
laws did not apply therto. Then in the famous Southeastern
Underwriters case the United States Supreme Court reversed itself, held that the Sherman Act was fully applicable to the
business of insurance, found no exemption therefrom and brushed aside the argument that state controls would be adversely affected. 09 In doing so it argued that states had subjected combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate and boycott
105 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867,

884 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). See generally: United States v. Chicago Mortgage Bankers

Ass'n, 123 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. IMI. 1954); Peoples Say. Bank v. Stoddard, 351

Mich. 842, 88 N.W.2d 462 (1958); Peoples Bank v. Lamar County Bank, 107

Miss. 852, 67 So. 961 (1915); Hall v. San Jacinto Bank, 255 S.W. 506, 510 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1923) (dictum). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F.
Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1965), the court said at 351
that although the comptroller of the currency was directed to consider the effect
upon competition in passing upon mergers, he was not required to give that
factor any particular weight.
106 National Bank Act § 85, 12 U.S.C. § 85; Federal Res. Act §§ 11, 150(b),
12 U.S.C. §§ 232, 371(b) (in addition to other sweeping powers, interest rates
may be controlled).
107 E.g., Ill. Bank Act §§ 48, 51, IlM. Rev. Stat. ch. 16 , §§ 149, 152.
108 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867,

905 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); Gruis, Antitrust Laws and Their Application to Banking, 24
Ceo. Wash. L. Rev. 89, 90-93 (1955). But cf. Edwards, Concentration in Banking, 46 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 294, 300, 1964).
109 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944-).
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competitors to the state antitrust laws and hence that no disruption
of the state regulatory systems would result."0 It is true that in
earlier years the state antitrust laws had been widely applied to
the business of insurance."' What the court overlooked was the
fact that states had subsequently widely supplanted antitrust
litigation with interventionist regulation."12 That fact was pointed
out vividly in the dissent of Chief Justice Stone."' s Mr. Justice
Jackson noted that the effect of the decision was to require an
extensive overhauling of state legislation at the very least." 4 The
Congress responded to the decision in Southeastern Underwriters
by the enactment of the McCarran law. The heart of that measure
is found in §2 providing that "the [anti-trust laws] shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law."' 5 Then the measure contains exceptions with respect to boycotts and other activities not
related to mergers."" Shortly thereafter, state legislatures were
induced to enact new measures which the authors thought con110 Id. at 562.

,M'Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 76 Ark, 303, 89 S.W. 42 (1905); Atlanta

Ass'n of Fire Ins. Agents v. McDonald, 181 Ga. 105, 181 S.E. 82 (19,5);
Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 119 Kan. 452, 239 Pac. 974, 979 (1925);
State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097 (1893); Huston v. Rentlinger, 91
Ky. 333, 15 S.W. 867, 869 (1891); Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 582, 171
N.E. 294, 299 (1930); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485, 38
N.W. 474 (1888); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 387, 88 So. 883, 888,
889 (1921); Miller v. Fidelity Union Fire Ins. Co., 126 Miss. 301, 88 So. 711
(1921); State ex rel. Barker v. Assurance Co., 251 Mo. 278, 158 S.W. 640, 64546 (1913); State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W.
595, 603 (1899); State v. American Sur. Co., 91 Neb. 22, 135 N.W. 365 (1912);
McCarter v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 372, 73 At. 80 (1909); Potomac
Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 18 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Griffin v.
Palatine Ins. Co., 238 S.V. 637 (Tex. Com. App. 1922); LV State Antitrust
Laws (Martin ed. 1940). See Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 603, 70 N.W. 107,
109, rehearing denied, 71 N.W. 428 (1897); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth,
106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624, 630 (1899); American Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 75 Miss.
24, 22 So. 99, 103 (1897) (dicta). Some authorities looked in the opposite
direction: Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899);
Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Sproles Motor Lines, 94 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397, 404, 406 (1893);
Harris v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 746, 73 S.E. 561 (1912).
12 Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the United States (1927).
113 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 581
(1944), reversing 51 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ga. 1943).
114 Id. at 590.
115 McCarran Act of March 9, 1945 § 2(b), 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b)
(1945). A brief history of the legislation will be found in Senate Committee on
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust & Monopoly, The Insurancie Industry, S.
Rep. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 4 (1960).
116 California League of Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. Co., 179 F. Supp. 65,
66 (N.D. Cal 1959); United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915,
922 (E.D. La. 1957).
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formed to the requirements of the McCarran Act." 7 Thus in
anti-merger litigation brought under the federal laws at the
present time, the defendant will rely on the existence of state
regulation.
Whether that reliance is well-founded may depend upon what
the word "regulated" in the McCarran Act means. In drafting the
state legislation mentioned above, it was widely assumed that the
federal exemption would apply if interventionist type legislation
were in effect in the several states. Accordingly, most of the states
undertook to regulate rates, to control the forms of policies and
the like." 8 For a time it appeared that the courts would regard
such legislation as ample to bring the business within the scope
of the McCarran Act exemption." 9 And it was said that no particular amount of administrative activity upon the part of the states
was required to bring the exemption into play; it sufficed if the
enactment were on the state statute books.

20

More recently, how-

ever, the idea has arisen that regulation within the meaning of the
McCarran Act must consist of antitrust type legislation. A recent
district court case involving an acquisition makes that position
abundantly plain. The court there wrote:
The respective states here involved have not acted pursuant to the McCarran Act empowering them to legislate on
insurance matters, in that they do not have a provision precisely comparable to §7 [of the Clayton Act] proscribing
acquisition of stock of another corporation. It is not sufficient
that a state have legislated on other insurance or antitrust
1 21
matters.

"1 Brook, Public Interest and the Commissioners' All-Industry Laws, 15
Law & Contemp. Prob. 606, 611 (1950); Donovan, Regulation of Insurance
Under the McCarran Act, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473, 485 (1950); Naujoks,
Eight Years After S.E.A.U., 35 Marq. L. Rev. 339, 854 (1952). Note the
exemption contained in Merchant Marine Act § 29(b), relating to marine insurance.
118 Illinois Insurance Code § 454-56, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73 § 1065; Naujoks,
supra n. 117, at 351, 355.
119 Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1953). See
California League of Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860,
179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (dictum); Donovan, supra n. 117, at 490.
But cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (narrow construction of statute).
120 Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958).
12 1 United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D.
111 1965).

19661

A DEFENSE To ANtI-TRusT

When pressed by the defendants with the argument that insurance was regulated in the same manner as public utilities in the
relevant states, the court rejected the argument and insisted that
the exemption was not called into play unless there were specific
anti-merger legislation of the type found in §7 of the federal
Clayton Act. 122 Since only a handful of states have enacted mea-

sures of that type, it is apparent that the decision in question, if
followed by other courts, could effectively nullify the McCarran
Act exemption.
Another difficulty with the exemption lies in the geographic
scope of state regulatory power. It is clear that domiciliary states
may exercise controls over insurance companies. Furthermore,
nondomiciliary states may regulate foreign insurance companies
who solicit business within the state only by mail.123 Nevertheless,
it has been held that the Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction over activities in non-domiciliary states, the court saying
that exemption requires regulation by those states who citizens
are solicited to buy insurance. 1 24 It follows that the exemption may
only apply when each state where business is done has a complete
roster of antitrust statutes to meet the requirements of the McCarran Act.1s Finally, to the extent that insurance business is
done "in" interstate commerce and not merely within several
states, state regulation may not suffice because of lack of state
power over such interstate commerce. 26 At best, therefore, the
states may have merely concurrent jurisdiction over the insurance
business. 127 As in other fields, therefore, the courts seem bent on
122 Id. at 71, 72. Knowlton, Jurisdictionof the FTC over Trade Practices of
Insurers, 1955 Ins. L.J. 673, 678.
123Travelers' Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
124 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Travelers' Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 298

(1960); Grand Jury Investigation, Aviation Insurance, 183 F. Supp. 374, 380
(S.D. N.Y. 1960). But cf. National Cas. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 245

F.2d 883
(6th Cir. 1957).
' 25 American Hosp. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), aff'd
per curiam,
357 U.S. 560 (1958).
126
American Hosp. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), aff'd per
curiam, 357 U.S. 560 (1958); United States v. Chicago Title &Trust Co., 242 F.
Supp. 56, 70 (N. D. Ii. 1965) (semble); Lilly, insurance as Comrherce, 11 Md.

L. Rev. 81, 97 (1950). But cf. Grand Jury Investigation, Aviation Insurance, 183

F. Supp. 374, 379 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
12American Hosp. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 234 F.2d 719 (5th'Cii. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 357 U.S. 560 (1958); Knowlton, supra n. 122, at 675 (contrary
veiw). An interesting question arises as to how conflicts among the several states
are to be resolved. Brook, supra n. 117, at 618. Some state statutes provide for
(Continued on next page)
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asserting the supremacy of the federal antitrust laws over all other
considerations of public policy. Legislation of other kinds is to be
disregarded through the device of interpreting the McCarran Act
as narrowly as possible. 2 8 Accordingly, at this writing, there may
be no exemption from the federal anti-trust laws in favor of
mergers among insurance companies.
Natural gas pipe lines. Under the provisions of §7 of the
Natural Gas Act acquisitions by licensed pipe lines must be approved by the Federal Power Commission. 2 9 In passing upon
such applications the Commission has been directed to take account of antitrust considerations on the ground that the public
convenience and necessity includes the maintenance of competition. There has also been a hint that the Commission should assume a protectionist viewopint in so doing. 30 In the leading case
the Federal Power Commission approved the end-to-end merger
of the El Paso and Pacific Northwest pipe lines.' 3 ' For that conduct the Commission was sternly rebuked by the United States
Supreme Court. 32 It noted that the Attorney General had instituted a proceeding under §7 of the Clayton Act before the Commission heard the merger application. While invited to do so, the
Attorney General declined to participate in hearings before the
Federal Power Commission. The district court continued the
antitrust case pending resolution of the Federal Power Commission proceeding. The Supreme Court held that the Commission should not even have considered the application while the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

reciprocity and retaliation, e.g., I11. Ins. Code §§ 443, 444, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73
§§ 1055,
1056.
128 Cf. Wilburn v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 319 (1955);

Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A case Study in the Workability of
Regulated Competition, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 199, 214 (1958). As to the impact of
state regulation, consult Stelzer, The Insurance Industry and the Antitrust Laws,
1955 Ins. L.J. 137, 151. In some old cases the recitals suggest the feasibility of
price competition, e.g., Huston v. Rentlinger, 91 Ky. 333, 15 S.W. 867 (1891).
The contrary view is presented in Stelzer, supra at 141.
129 Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1962).
130 California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 484-85 (1962). The
protectionist viewpoint is suggested by the citation therein of City of Pittsburgh
v. Federal Power Commn, 237"F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Further proceedings
in the last cited matter are reported as Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation,
19 P.U.R.3d 76 (F.P.C. 1957). The Federal Power Commission did not take a
protectionist viewpoint therein (at 88-89).
1131
3 2 Pacific Noxthwest Pipeline Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 456. 461 (F.P.C. 1959).
California v. Federal Power Commn, 369 U.S. 482, 487-88 (1962).
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complaint was pending in the courts. 133 The Commission was told
that it had exceeded its jurisdiction and undertaken to decide a
question which could only be determined by the federal courts.
Here again, national policy, as expressed in decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, appears to make the antitrust laws paramount over all other legislation. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
expressly provided that it should not be applicable to transactions
duly consummated pursuant to authority of the Federal Power
Commission. 3 4 Notwithstanding the express language of the
statute, which was disposed of thrugh "interpretation,"'135 it was
held that there was no exemption from the antitrust laws in favor
of natural gas pipe line companies. 136 It follows that operators of
gas pipe lines are fully subject to the anti-merger laws. They
must apply to the Federal Power Commission for permission to
make an acquisition but cannot do so if a complaint is pending
in the district court under §7 of the Clayton Act or some other
antitrust statute. It is not clear how long the parties to such a
merger must wait for a complaint to be filed in the courts prior to
the institution of an application before the Commission. Here
again, we find an almost incredible situation in that the Federal
Power Commission has been directed to consider antitrust issues
but has no authority to decide such matters in a final manner.
Communications.Carriers by wire or radio are subject to interventionist regulation at the hands of the Federal Communications
Commission and state agencies.137 Under the terms of federal

233Id

at 490. wherein the Court wrote:

Our function is to see that the policy entrusted to the courts is not
frustrated by an administrative agency. Where the primary jurisdiction
is in the agency, courts withhold action until the agency has acted ....
The converse should also be true, lest the antitrust policy whose enforcement Congress in this situation has entrusted to the courts is in
practical effect taken over by the Federal Power Commission.
But cf. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385
(9th Cir. 1953).
134 Clayton Act § 7(4), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
136 California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 486-89 (1962).
136 Id. at 485. Accord, Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151
F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1945), modification denied, 153 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1946),
cr't. denied, 329 U.S. 737 (1946); American Fuel & Power Co., 122 F.2d 223,
228 (6th Cir. 1941); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co.,'95"F. Supp. 977
(D. Minn. 1951), aff'd, 204 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1953). But cf. Panhandle E.
Pipeline Co., 92 P.U.R. (n.s.) 370, 381-82 (I. 1951).
"37Communications Act of 1934 § 205(a), 47 U.S.C. § 506(a); Public
Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111 2/s, § 10.3 (1921).
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legislation telephone and telegraph companies may consolidate
only with approval of the Federal Communications Commission. 3 8 Similar controls exist in the states. Federal legislation
contains an express exemption from application of the antitrust
laws to mergers thus approved by the Commission 139 and, unlike
some other express exemptions, this one appears not yet to have
been interpreted away by the courts. Under state law the modem
view is that acquisitions in the communications field are no longer
subject to the antitrust laws and that commission approval suffices
to validate such a transaction.140 No major merger decision by the
Federal Communications Commission has yet been reviewed by
1 8 Communications Act of 1934 § 221, 47 U.S.C. § 522.
139Id. § 221(a). An interesting sidelight on the communications industry
is afforded by the proceedings reported as United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (No. 17-49, consent decree)
68,246 (C.D. N.J. Jan. 24,
1956). The consent decree therein entered appears to recognize that the telephone
business is regulated and not subjct to the antitrust laws. Staff of Antitrust Subcommittee, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on
Consent Decree Program of Dept. of Justice 317 (Comm. Print 1959).
140 State Pub. Util. Comm n v. Romberg, 275 IlL App. 432, 114 N.E. 191
(1916). Inthat case the court said at 196:
The public policy of the State... is not opposed to the elimination
of competition in all cases, but only applies where a monopoly, in the
sense in which that word was used in the common law, would be thereby created.... No such consequences can follow the purchase by the
American Company of a controlling interest in the Inter-State Company
under the authority conferred upon it by the State Public Utilities act.
The American Company will not by this purchase acquire the right to
exclude any other person or corporation from engaging in the telephone
business in the same field of operation, nor will it be within its power
to arbitrarily limit the service to be furnished the public of fix the rates
to be charged for the service rendered. The State possesses the right to
exercise supervision over public utilities with reference to such matters,
and has made provision for the exercise of such right through the State
Public Utilities Commission. Instead of resulting in injury to the public,
the tendency of the elimination of the Inter-State Company as a
competitor of the Bell system would be to benefit the public.
The court went on to say at 196:
The interests of the public are not best served by competition in the
telephone business, but by the consolidation and merger of the competing
lines and regulation as to rate and service by the State or some agency
.thereof.
In the same vein are Palmyra Tel. Co. v. Modesto Tel. Co., 336 Il. App. 158,
164-65, 167 N.E. 860 (1929); Mitchell v. Public Serv. Comm n, 276 Pa. 390, 120
Atl. 447 (1923); Perry Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Com'n, 265 Pa. 274, 108 AtL. 659,
660 (1919); McKinley Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 152 Wis. 359, 140 N.W.
38 (1913). See State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville By. & Light Co., 151 Tenn.
77, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925) (dictum). In the older law the contrary view
was often taken: United States Tel. Co. v. Central Union Co., 171 Fed. 130, 14647 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1909), aff'd, 202 Fed. 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1913); Dunbar v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 Ill. App. 456, 485-86, 87 N.E. 521 (1909);
Cochranton Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 263 Pa. 506. 107 Atl. 2.3 (1919);
Jones v, Carter, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 450, 101 S.W. 514 (1907).
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the courts. 141 In a leading case involving licensing of competitive
service, however, the United States. Supreme Court instructed
the Commission that it was not to give much weight to antitrust
considerations. Denying that competition of itself constituted a
national policy in the communications field, the court went on to
say:
The very fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the
comprehensive regulation of communications embodied in the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the notion
that national1 42policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications.

The court also said: "Merely to assume that competition is bound
to be of advantage, in an industry so regulated and so largely
1
closed as is this one, is not enough.'

43

Subsequently the Commission nevertheless granted a license for
a competitive service and was sustained on appeal. 144 Most of the
commentary on the communications industry has focused upon
incorporation of manufacturing elements, and particularly Western Electric Company, into regulated utilities.' 4 5 The problem of
vertical integration in a controlled industry is, of course, different
41
1
A merger was approved in New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C. 261, 267
(1943). Note that under the Communications Act of 1934 (§ 314) a wireless
licensee is not authorized to acquire a telephone business if the effect is substantially to lessen competition.
142 Federal Communications Comm'n v. R.C.A. Communications, Inc., 346
U.S. 86, 93 (1953). The court also said at 92:
Prohibitory legislation like the Sherman Law, defining the area within which 'competition' may have full play, of course loses its effectiveness
as the practical limitations increase; as such considerations severely
limit the number of separate enterprises that can efficiently, or conveniently, exist, the need for careful qualification of the scope of
compe2ttion becomes manifest. Surely it cannot be said in these situations that competition is of itself a national policy. To do so would disregard not only those areas of economic activity so long committed
to government monopoly as no longer to be thought open to competition,
such as the post office . . . and those areas, loosely spoken of as
natural monopolies or-more broadly-public utilities, in which active
regulation has been necessary to compensate for the inability of
competition to provide adequate regulation. It would most strikingly disregard not only those areas of economic activity so long committed
on competition to one of providing relief from the rigors of competition,
as has been true of railroads.
143Id. at 97. Accord: Mackay Radio Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
97 F.2d 641, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
144 R.C.A. Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 238
F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
45 House Report on Consent Decree Program, supra note 139, ch. 2.
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from that faced in the free sector of the economy.14 Mergers in
and of themselves have not aroused much comment.
Ocean carriers.Under the terms of the Shipping Act common
carriers by water are subject to rate regulation at the hands of the
Federal Maritime Commission.147 While all contracts among ocean
carriers must be filed with the Commission and are subject to its
approval, 48 that section of the statute does not appear to contemplate that the Commission shall control mergers as such. Accordingly, acquisitions may be unregulated. At one time, it was
widely thought that the Commission*enjoyed primary jurisdiction
over ocean carriers 149 but even that rule is now subject to doubt.150
Accordingly, the anti-merger laws applicable in the free sector of
the economy may be fully in effect with respect to ocean carriers
despite the fact that any contract approved by the Commission is
the subject of an express exemption.' 5 ' Actually, mergers and
acquisitions do not appear to have been the subject of important
litigation in this industry. Here the focal point has been the
"dual rate" system and exclusion from "conferences" of carriers. 12i
Organized exchanges. Under several federal statutes organized
exchanges are subject to rigorous controls. Among those statutes
are the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Securities Exchange
Act.15 3 Under both those statutes the controls over the exchanges

and the members thereof are indeed extensive. Nothing therein,
however, appears to apply to mergers among exchanges. The
146Sheahan, Integration and Exclusion in the Telephone Equipent Int-

dustry, 70 Q. J. Econ. 267 (1956). Cf. Averch & Johnson, The Behavior of Firms
under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 1052 (1962).
1'7Shipping Act § 18, 46 U.S.C. § 8.18 (1916). Controls over domestic
water carriers are exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the
provisions of Interstate Commerce Act, Part I1, 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23.
14sShipping Act-§ 15, 46 U.S.C. § 8.15 (1916).
'49

American Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate Conference, 126 F. Supp. 91,

93 (S.D.
N.Y. 1954), affd per curiam, 222 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1955).
50
1
Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 496 £1958);

Grand Jury Investigation, Shipping, 186 F. Supp. 298, 308-09 (D.D.C. 1960);

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.06 (1958).
151 Shipping Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 8.15 (1916). But cf. California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); Grand Jury Investigation, Shipping, 186
F. Supp. 298, 807 (D.D.C. 1960). Note that Commission approval only extends

to contracts among ocean carriers. A vertical merger might well not be preceded by such a contract.
152E.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 239 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956),

af'd, 356 U.S. 481 (1958).

153 Packers and Stockyards Act §§ 202, 305, 7 U.S.C. § 192 (1921); Securities

Exchange Act §§ 6, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1934).
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Packers and Stockyards Act specifically provides that both the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act shall not be deemed to have
been repealed as to the persons controlled by it; but the Federal
Trade Commission is ousted of its jurisdiction to the extent that
15 4
similar powers are vested in the Secretary of Agriculture
Nothing to that effect appears in the Securities Exchange Act and
the leading case indicates that such exchanges are fully subject to
the antitrust laws despite the plenary character of regulation existing in the Securities Exchange Commission."r While there appears
to have been no litigation with respect to mergers of exchanges,
the courts have expressly recognized that one exchange may be
in competition with another (oddly enough coupling that assertion with the further statement that the exchange constituted a
public utility subject to regulation).1 5 6
Alcoholic beverages. Both at the federal and state level the
business of distilling, brewing, distributing and retailing alcoholic
beverages is subject to close controls. Several of the provisions of
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act sound as if they were
copied from the federal antitrust laws. 157 State legislation is
frequently designed to enforce a rigid pattern of separation among
the several vertical layers of the industry. Thus under the Illinois
statute direct sales from distillers to retailers are prohibited and
the services of an independent wholesaler are made mandatory. 5 s
No specific provisions appear with respect to mergers. Prior to the
enactment of modern liquor legislation, following repeal, the state
courts held that combinations and acquisitions were subject to
154 Packers and Stockyards Act H§ 405, 406, 7 U.S.C. H§ 206, 207 (1921).
Cf. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). A case of considerable

interest is United States v. Swift & Co., 46 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D. Col. 1942),

remanded on other grounds, 318 U.S. 442 (1943). There the meat packers were
indicted for allegedly agreeing to buy land only at the Denver market. Noting
that the market was regulated, the court held the indictment insufficient but did
not comment directly on the conflict between regulation and the Sherman Act.
155 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 220 (S.D. N.Y. 1961),
afid, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
156 Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n,
356 U.S. 282. 288, 289 (1958). Several interesting cases have concerned the allocation of selling time at tobacco auctions by local boards of trade. E.g., Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 263 F.2d 502, 509-11 (4th
Cir. 1959). Some light on the relationship between the investment banking
business and regulation under the federal securities law is shed by United States
v. Morgan. 118 F. Supp. 621, 691, 693, 697 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
157Federal Alcohol Administration Act § 5(a), 8, 27 U.S.C. H9 205, 208
(1935).
158 Alcoholic Liquors § 1, 3, IMI.Rev. Stat. ch. 43, § 96, 115, 121(e).
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antitrust or common law provisions of the same kind.5 9 Since
then, there appears to have been no significant litigation with
respect to mergers but in several cases, without even pausing to
examine the effect of regulation, the federal courts have held that
the antitrust laws apply to other aspects of the conduct of persons
in the alcoholic beverage industry. 160 Occasionally, the courts have
suggested that the detailed prescriptions of the interventionist
regulation make it impossible to apply antitrust principles, 161 but
the weight of authority is to the contrary. It therefore appears
that mergers in this industry will be governed by the principles
applicable in the free sector of the economy.
Gas distribution. Supplying gas to industrial, commercial and
residential patrons through mains is an old and closely regulated
business. Almost all states regulate that industry through commissions and the organic statutes frequently provide for commission approval of mergers, acquisitions and consolidations.1'
Befor enactment of such legislation it was common to hold that
antitrust principles applied to the gas distribution business. A
colorful decision with respect to the consolidation of rival gas
companies in the city of Chicago held such conduct unlawful,
saying:
Whatever tends to prevent competition between those
engaged in a public employment, or business impressed with
a public character, is opposed to public policy and, therefore,
unlawful. Whatever tends to create a monopoly is unlawful as
being contrary to public policy.les
In such opinions the view often expressed was that antitrust
principles should be applied more stringently to public utility
159 State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155 (1890). See

Dittman v. Distilling Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 537, 54 AUt. 570, 573 (1903) (dictum).
160 United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945);
United States v. Erie County Malt Beverage Ass'n, 264 F.2d 731, 733 (3rd Cir.
1959); Washington Brewers Institute v. United States, 137 F.2d 964, 968 (9th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 776 (1943) (This opinion, however, contains
language indicating that exemption is a possibility); United States v. United
Liquors Corp., 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S.

991 (1957).
161 Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 201 Md. 58, 92 A.2d 560, 564 (1953);
United States v. Maryland State License Ass'n, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 685, 699-700
(D. Md. 1956).
162 Public Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111 2, § 22 (1921).
163People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 I1. App. 268, 293,
22 N.E. 798 (1889).
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companies than to those in the free sector of the economy. 164 Now
that almost all states have enacted regulatory statutes it is highly
doubtful whether the same result would be achieved. In other
words, it is believed that gas distribution companies are exempt
from the operation of state antitrust laws insofar as mergers and
acquisitions are concerned. 16 5 Since gas distribution is largely a
local activity it is unlikely that federal legislation would be applied to them. 66
Generation and distribution of electricity. As in the case of gas
utilities, electric generating and distributing companies are
thoroughly regulated both at the federal and state level. The
federal statute expressly refers to mergers and acquisitions 67 and
similar provisions frequently appear in state legislation. 68 At the
federal level it appears that the Federal Power Commission enjoys primary jurisdiction over electric utilities' 69 but that nevertheless such companies remain open to some types of antitrust
164Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1889). Cf. McKinny v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 206 Fed. 772, 777 (D. Kan. 1913); City of
Okmulgee v. Okmulgee Gas Co., 140 Okla. 88, 282 Pac. 640, 650-51 (1939);
People v. Union Gas. Co., 254 MI1.App. 395 409, 412, 98 N.E. 768 (1912)
(dictum). In another case the court appeared to find no exemption for a gas
distribution system from a statute which only forbad emonology pricing. Gathright v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 154 Ky. 106, 154 S.W. 45, 55 (1913).
165 Attorney Gen. v. Consolidated Gas Co., 124 App. Div. 401, 108 N.Y.
Supp. 823 (1908). In that case the court said at 826:
That a single company thus regulated by law as to price and production
does not offend against the anti-monopoly laws, even although its field
of operation extends over a whole city, seems to be quite clear.
Competition between two or more companies, each occupying exclusively
a separate field of operation, which would benefit no one. A competition
which would operate to reduce prices must be between companies occupying the same field, and, while the consolidation of control effected
by the purchases of stock in other companies by the Consolidated
Company does not necessarily prevent such competition, it is the
settled policy of the state to discourage competition of this character ....
Cf. Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 37 App. Div. 618, 56 N.Y. Supp. 288, 291
(1899); State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville By. & Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 268
S.W. 120, 124 (1925) (dictum). There is often an express exemption for
mergers approved by a commission. E.g., Public Utiliites Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
11 2/s, § 27 (1921). There has also been legislation specifically permitting the
consolidation of gas companies. People ex rel. Deneen v. Peoples Gas, Light &
Coke 6Co., 205 IlM.App. 482, 68 N.E. 950 (1903).
'C Thomason v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F. Supp. 598, 599 (W.D. La.
1937), aff'd, 98 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1938).
167 Federal Power Act §§ 8, 203, 16 U.S.C. §§ 801 (1920); 824(b) (1935).
168111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1112/, § 27(d) (1921); Twentieth Century Fund,
Electric Power and Government Policy 254 (1948).
169 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 343 U.S.
414, 422-24 (1952).
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litigation. 170 If the Federal Power Commission enters an order,
however, the fact that the conduct so prescribed might otherwise
violate the antitrust laws will be disregarded.17 ' Similar rules appear to apply in the states 72 and there is nothing to indicate that
state commissions discourage mergers; on the contrary they ap73
pear to encourage them.

A landmark of electric utility control is the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935. That legislation was designed to
break up electric utilities into smaller and geographically cohesive units.

7

4

And while under state law the combining of dif-

ferent forms of utility service (gas, electricity, water, heat and the
like) is not discouraged, 175 the Securities and Exchange Commission. in administering the Holding Company Act frequently required the separation of electric from gas and other utilities. 17
Thus while there has been little litigation of the conventional
anti-merger type we have seen a considerable disintegration of
electric companies under the impact of the holding company
statute. To some extent, of course, that disintegration has been
costly in that economies of scale may have been sacrificed.
Contractual arrangements for interconnection of the companies
170 Pennsylvania Water Co .v. Consolidated Gas Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950), 186 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1951).
171Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 343 U.S.
414, 421-22 (1952). Cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv.
Co., 341 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1951). A different view with respect to the same
utility company was expressed in Montana - Dakota Util. Co. v. Williams
Cooperative, 263 F.2d 431, 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1959).
172Phelan v. Edison Elec. Co., 24 Misc. 109, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305 (1898);
York Haven Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 287 Pa. 241, 134 Ati. 419
(1926); Motter v. Kennett Elec. Co., 212 Pa. 613, 62 AUt. 104 (1905). Sometimes state statutes contain an express exemption. E.g., Public Utilities Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 1112/, § 27 (1921). Contrary results were reported in Keene
Syndicate v. Wichita Power Co., 69 Kan. 284, 76 Pac. 834 (1904); San Antonio
Gas Co.
v. State, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 54 S.W. 289, 293 (1899).
73
1'
In re Scranton Elec. Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 552 (F.P.C. 1956); Puget Sound
Power & Light Co., 100 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129 (Wash. 1953); In re Pennsylvania
Water and Power Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 167 (F.P.C. 1955); McDonald, Let There Be
Light: The Electric Utility Industry in Wisconsin, 1881-1955, 94 (1957);
Twentieth Century Fund, op. cit. supra n. 168, at 342.
'74 Public Utility Holding Company Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935).
175 Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537 (1930),
opinion revised, 282 U.S. 187, per curiam, (1930); People ex rel. Municipal Gas
Co. v. Rice, 138 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 151, 33 N.E. 846, 848 (1893); Motter v. Kennett Elec. Co., 212 Pa. 613, 62 AUt. 104 (1905); Troxel, Economics of Public
Utilities 202-03 (1947).
176 Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 463, 470-71 (SEC 1957); In re
Electric Bond and Share Co., 95 P.U.R. (n.s) 259 (SEC 1952); In re New
England Electric System, 88 P.U.R. (n.s.) 47 (SEC 1951); Lynn Gas &
Electric Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 209, 212 (Mass. Dept. Pub. Util. 1959).
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are now replacing the older linkage through mergers and holding companies. Again, whether prohibition by the SEC of the
combination of gas, electric and similar services in a single
77
company has been beneficial may also be questioned.
Local transit. While streetcars, buses and taxis are extensively
controlled at the state or local level, there appears to be no antitrust exemption in their favor within the federal system. 78 On
the other hand, most such services are local in character and
will be controlled by state lawQ Here the weight of authority
indicates that regulation has supplanted competition and suggests that mergers will be valid even though they might otherwise violate anti-merger statutes.8 0
Regulated industries in perspective. Given the penchant of

the United States Supreme Court for declaring anti-trust policy to
override all other considerations, statutory or otherwise, it appears
likely that only an express exemption will free regulated businesses from the full impact of the anti-merger legislation for the
free sector of the economy.""' The wisdom of any such rule is, of
course, open to question. If regulation is pervasive in character
there would seem no need to attack mergers; indeed, perhaps
mergers should be encouraged. There also appears to be a trend
among regulatory tribunals toward the approval of mergers un' 77 Troxel, Economics of Public Utilities 207 (1947). Cf. Cramton, Diversifica-

tion of Ownership in the Regulated Industries, 19 A.B.A. Rep. (Anti-trust Sect.)

362, 373 (1961). Little authority has been found with respect to water companies.
The two eases discovered suggest that mergers are not subject to the antitrust
laws. Cameron v. New York Water Co, 133 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 336, 31 N.E. 104
(1892); State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville Ry & Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 268
S.W. 120, 124 (1925) (dictum).
178 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), 80 F. Supp. 936
(N.D. IM. 1948), af'd, 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
179 Id. at 230, 231.
's0 Continental See. Co. v. Interborough Co., 207 Fed. 467 (S.D. N.Y.1913).
Venner v. Chicago C. Ry, 258 Ill. App. 523, 101 N.E. 949, 955 (1913); Wood
v. Seattle, 23 Wash. 1, 62 Pac. 135, 142 (1900). See State ex tel. Thompson v.
Nashville Ry. & Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925) (dictum).
Cf. Capitol Taxicab Co. v. Cermak, 60 F.2d 608, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1932); Yellow
Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 396 I. App. 388, 71 N.E.2d 652, 657-58 (1947).
See also People v. City of Chicago, 349 Il. App. 304. 326, 182 N.E. 419 (1932)
(dictum). Several state statutes, however, were specifically directed at street railroads. LIV State Antitrust Laws (Martin ed. 1940). Some decisions also look in
that direction. North Little Rock Co. v. City, 207 Ark. 976, 184 S.W.2d 52, 55
(1945); Southern Elec. Sec. Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195, 44 So. 785 (1907). Cf.
Scott v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 97 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 75 S.W. 7, 16 (1903)
(dictum).
181 E.g., California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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less other members of the industry may be injured thereby. In
other words, the commissions are apt to protect existing firms
against stronger competition. Here again, consumers may well
be losers.1 12 To the extent that there are elements of indivisibility
in regulated business (and the coming of electronic data processing may have a bearing on that subject) it would seem
desirable to encourage mergers in pervasively regulated industries.
182 Hale & Hale, Mergers in Regulated Industries, 59 N. U.L. Rev. 49, 61
(1964). A different view is suggested in Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria:
Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and Size, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 211, 228 (1964).
Those authors take the position that the courts may consider "'erfonance"
criteria in regulated industries as opposed to relying solely on measures of
concentration.

